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NEITHER FISH NOR FOWL: ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGES IN THE
MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Russell L. Weaver*
Linda D. Jellum"'
This article examines the role of administrative adudication in the United
States constitutionalsystem. It begins by noting that such ad/udicationfits
uncomfortably within a system of divided powers. Administrative judges,
including adminitrative law judges [ALJs/ (who have the highest level of
protection and status), are considerably more circumsci'bed than ordinary
Article III judges. Indeed, adminitrativejudges are usualy housed in the
agencies for which they decide cases, rather than in independent adjudicative
bodies, and they do not always have the final say regarding the cases the)
decide. In man)' instances, the agency can appeal an adverse administrative
judge's decision directly to the head of the agenq', and the agen' head retains
broad power to overrule the administrativejudge's determinations. In other
words, the ageny can substitute its judgment for that of the administrative
judge regardingfactualdeterminations, legal determinations,aldpolicy choices.
As a result, many administrative adjudicative stuc1tu
ires involve difficult tradeoffs between independence, political control, and accountabiliy. This article
examines issues related to the status andpower of administrativejudges, as
well as the constraints that have been imposed on administrative ad/udicative
authorit, and explores whether those constraints continue to serve the purposes
Jor which the) were originallyimposed.
Cet article examine le role du rdglement de dij]drends dans le domaine
administratifdans le cadre du systme constitutionneldes Etats-Unis. I/ note
d'abord qu'une telle fafon de regler les diffrends cadre difficilement avec un
systeme oh les pouvoirs sont diviseis. Les juges administratifs,y inclus lesjuges
de droit administratif(quijouissent du niveau le plus eieve de protection et de
statut), sont considirablement plus restreints que les juges ordinaires sous
l' rticle IIL En effet, lesjuges administratifs sont d'habitude logis dans les
agences pour lesquelles ils decident les cas, plutdt qu'au sein d'organismes
independants de riglement de diffirends, et ils n'ontpay toufours le dernier mot
dans les cas qu'ilsjugent. Dans bien des cas, /'agence peut porter en appel
directement au chef de l'agence une decision defavorable d'un/juge administratif
et le chef de i'agence posside de vastes pouvoirspouir anluuller la diision du juge
admillistratif En d'autres mots, I'agence peut substituerson jugement a celui
du jge adminitratyquant aux decisions de fait, aux deisions de droit et
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aux choix de politiques. Par consequent, plusieurs structures de reglement de
dzi§rends dans le domaine administratifcomportent des compromis def/iciles
entre /independance, le contrdle politique et l'obligation de rendre compte. Cet
article examine des questions se rapportant au statut et an pouvoir dejuges
administratfs,ainsi qu'aux contraintes qui ont eti imposees sur l'autoriti de
regler des difirends dans le domaine administratjf et explore la question a
savoir si ces contraintes continuent a servir les buts pour lesquels elles out eti
imposees originellement.
I. INTRODUCTION
Administrative adjudication has always rested uncomfortably in the United States
constitutional system. In theory, if not entirely in practice, the system includes
separation of powers principles, as well as the concept of checks and balances,
throughout the constitutional structure.'
For example, the Constitution vests
legislative power in Congress, judicial power in the courts and executive power in
the President.' However, the lines of separation between the branches are not
complete; and, there are many instances when power is divided between two
branches of government. For example, not only must both houses of Congress pass
legislation, it must be presented to the President for signature or veto.
Modern administrative agencies present significant challenges to the notion of
separated powers because they frequently perform many functions committed to
coordinate branches of government. For example, many agencies "legislate" (in the
sense of creating rules and regulations that can have the force and effect of legislative
enactments), "adjudicate" (in the sense of deciding cases), and "administer" (in the
sense of executing and administering the laws). Additionally, although most

administrative agencies reside in the executive branch of government, Congress has
limited the President's authority to remove the heads of some agencies and other
executive officials,' and thereby allowed those agencies to function relatively
independently of presidential authority.

6

Political philosophcrs whose ideas influenced the writing of the United States Constitution include
(but arc hardly limited to) MIontcsquicu and Lockc. See Baron dc MIontcsquicu, The.Sit ol.aSp,
David Wallace Carrithers ed translated by Thomas Nugent, (London: Nourse, 1750; Berkeley:
Univcrsity of California Press, 1977) at 202. "When the lcgislatiN and cxecutivc powers arc united in
the same person, or in the same body of magistracy, there can then be no liberty .... ); John Locke,
Two Treatises o/Government, Peter Laslctt, ed, 2d ed. ( London: Cambridge UniNcrsity Press, 1690,
1970) at 380. ("the legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands; for it
being but a delegated power from the people, they who hav c it cannot pass it oxvcr to others.").
U.S. Const. art. I, § 1 ("[a]ll legislative Powers .. . shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States...").
U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 ("[thc judicial Power of the United States, shall be vcstcd in one Supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.").
The framers founded an independent judiciary to rectify the mstakc of the English Constitution,
which made its judiciary subject to the control and pressures of Parliament. Trving R. Kaufman, "The
Essence of Judicial lndependencc" (1980) 80 Colum L Rc 671 at 672-87.
U.S. Const. art II, § 1 ("[tihe executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America.").
U.S. Const. art. 1§ 7.
See William F. Funk, Sidney A. Shapiro & Russell L. Wcavcr,AdminrtratiePracticeand Procedur:

8

Prolea and Cases, 4th cd, (St. Paiul, MN: West Publishing Company, 2010) at 517.
Ibi. See also Comodt Fuu Tadin Commikion i. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
See IIumphrey'r Executor . United
-tat
295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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One peculiarity of the U.S. administrative system is the fact that many agencies
are allowed to hear and adjudicate cases. Article III of the United States Constitution
vests judicial power in the federal courts' and provides Article III judges with lifetime
tenure and substantial independence from the other two branches of government.
Under the Constitution, Article III courts exercise broad power to "say what the law
is"" and have sometimes rendered sweeping decisions that have reshaped society." If
Congress wishes to override an Article III court's decision, Congress may have no
choice but to try and amend the Constitution (a process that rarely succeeds).
Administrative courts and adjudicative structures" function much differently." In
contrast to Article III judges, the powers of administrative judges, including
administrative law judges [ALJs] (who have the highest level of protection and
status)," are considerably more circumscribed. Administrative judges are usually
housed in the agencies for which they decide cases," rather than in independent
adjudicative bodies." In addition, administrative judges do not always have the final
say regarding the cases they decide. In many instances, the agency can appeal an

9

U.S. Const. art. 111.

10

Se Marlbur
n

11

See Roe . Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Brown . Board ofEducation, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
In the federal system, an adjudicative body can now be classified as an Article I, Article I, Article ITH,
or Article I court, in reference to the article of the Constitution from which the court's authority
stems. Article I courts arc typically Icgislativ c courts. Some examples include the Social Security
Administration's Office of Disability Adjudication and Review and the United States Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims. Thcrc arc many others. \rticle 11 courts arc generally established under
the President's authority pursuant as Commander in Chief to maintain ordcr and justice in military
occupied territories and insular possessions. Some examples include Guantanamo military
commission and High Court of American Samoa. The \rticlc III courts include the Supreme Court
of the United States and the inferior courts established by the Congress pursuant to its Article III
powers. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. There arc currently thirtccn courts of appeals, nincty-four district
courts, and the U.S. Court of International Trade. Article I courts are tribunals established in
territorics of the United States by the Congress, pursuant to thc Tcrritorial Clause. A fcw examples
of the Article IV courts that still exist include the United States District Court for the Northern
Mariana Islands, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands.
Commentators have long discussed the lack of independence in this area. For just a few examples,
see Ron Beal, "The Texas State Office of Administrative Hearings: Establishing Independent
Adjudicators in Contested Case Proceedings While Prcscrving the Power of Institutional DecisionMaking" (2005) 25 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 119; James F.
Flanagan, "Redcfining the Role of the State Administrativ c Law judge: Central Panels and Their
Impact on State AlJ Authority and Standards of Agency Review" (2002) 54 Admin I, Rev 1355 at
1382-85; Richard B. Hoffman & Frank P. Cihlar, "Judicial Independence: Can It Be Without Article
IT?'" (1995) 46 Mercer I. Rev. 863; Harold J. Krent & LIndsay DuVall, "Accommodating AlJ
Decision Making Independence with Institutional Interests of thc Administrativ cjudiciary" (2005) 25
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 1; 1. Hope O'Keeffe,
"Administrativc Law Judgcs, Performance Ev-aluation, and Production Standards: Judicial
Independence versus Employee Accountability", Note, (1986) 54 Geo Wash I, Rev 591.
See 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2009); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.131 (2007).
Administrativ c adjudicators hav c existed in the United States since the earliest times. See Louis G.
Caldwell, "A Federal Administrative Court" (1936) 84 U Pa l Rev 966 at 970 ("[U]nder a
bewildering medley of federal statutes, judicial functions galorc hav c been lodged in the President, in
agencies directly responsible to the President, in the heads of government departments, in
subordinate officials and bureaus in those departments, and in the so-called independent boards and
commissions...."). As early as 1936, there were "about seventy-three administrative tribunals in the
federal gov crnmcnt pcrforming judicial functions in about 267 classes of cases." Ibdat 970.
See Russell L. Weaver, "Management of AIJ Offices in Executive Departments and Agencies" (1995)
47 Admin I, Rev 303 ["Management of AlJ Offices'.
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Madion, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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adverse administrative judge's decision directly to the head of the agency.' If the
decision is not appealed, it becomes the "decision of the agency." Yet, if appealed,
the agency retains broad power to overrule the administrative judge's determinations
under the Administrative ProcedureAct [APA]: "On appeal from or review of the initial
decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have [had] in making the initial
decision...."" In other words, the agency can substitute its judgment for that of the
administrative judge regarding factual determinations, legal determinations, and
policy choices.
Aks a result, many administrative adjudicative structures involve difficult trade-offs
between independence, political control, and accountability. Most administrative
judges function as employees of the agencies for which they decide cases. If
independence is truly a core attribute of the American style of judging and if
administrative judges are not truly independent, then administrative judges may be
more accurately characterized as administrative functionaries with judge-like duties
than as true judges.
In this article, we examine issues related to the status and power of administrative
judges. We begin by examining the history and development of existing
administrative structures and the current status of the law. From there, we explain
the constraints that have been imposed on administrative adjudicative authority and
explore whether those constraints continue to serve the purposes for which they were
originally imposed. We then examine some of the ideas that have been floated
regarding how administrative judges (including ALJs) could be restructured and
governed. None of these ideas is entirely satisfactory. However, given that the status
quo is not entirely satisfactory either, it is worthwhile to re-examine some of these
ideas and to explore some new ones.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN ADJUDICATIVE STRUCTURE
Even though the modern administrative adjudicative system is imperfect, it is a vast
improvement over the system that preceded it. At the beginning of the nineteenth
century, most adjudications were presided over by "examiners" who were appointed
by the agencies themselves.' These examiners were hardly independent, holding the
status of "underling" or "subordinate"' in the sense that the agencies for which they
worked controlled their assignments, their compensation, their promotions, and their
retention." Indeed, some early examiners served completely at the pleasure of their

17

5 U.S.C.

18

cmpowered to make law through adjudication.
Ibid.

1

Ibid.

20

Agencies are somewhat limited in rejected ALJ Findings of fact based on testimonial evidence.
PenarquitosVillae . Nat. Labo Relations Bd., 565 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1977).
James R Moliterno, "The Administrative judiciary's Independence Myth" (2006) 41 Wake Forest L
Rev 1191 at 1197.
The term "cxamincrs" came into use in 1906. 3 Kenneth Culp Davis, Ad inLa
Ia Tatie
2d
ed. (San Dicgo: K. C. Davis Pub. Co., 1980) § 17.11, at 313.
See M\lanagement of AlJ Offices, supra note 16, at 303.
See Malcolm Rich, "Adapting the Central Panel System: A Study of Seven States" (1981) 65
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246 at 246 ('lhc agencies controlled the compensation and job tenure of their hearing
officers and could ignore their decisions and enter de novo rulings instead.").
1id at 303-04.

Judicaturc
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557(b). Of course, the reason for allowing appeals to the agency is that the agency is
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superiors and had no job security whatsoever." Hence, judicial "independence" and
"impartiality" were not an assured part of the administrative equation.
By the 1930s, commentators began to raise serious concerns regarding the status
of hearing examiners, as well as about their ability to decide cases fairly,
independently, and impartially." In a 1934 report, the American Bar Association's
[ABA] Special Committee on Administrative Law criticized the fact that some
examiners exercised both prosecutorial and adjudicative functions. One member of
the Committee summed up the concerns as follows:
If there is anything of which we can be relatively sure after some
hundreds, even thousands, of years of experience with judicial
machinery, it is that no man can be trusted to be judge in his own
case. And he is a judge in his own case if he is also the prosecutor
or if he is also the legislator who made the rule he is asked to
interpret and apply. Agency after agency in our federal government
is authorized to wield all three powers of government at once.
Wearing its legislative toga, a commission makes a regulation, on
compliance with which John Doe's right to continue in business
may depend. Having reason to believe that John Doe is guilty of
violating the regulation, the commission doffs the toga and, taking
up the executive sceptre, investigates and prosecutes him. With the
sceptre still in its hand, the commission hurriedly dons the judicial
ermine and proceeds to present itself at least two scintillas of
evidence to prove that it was right in the first place. While care is
sometimes taken to preserve the form of placing the burden of
proof on the prosecutor, all the form in the world cannot disguise
the fact that the burden is usually on John Doe to prove himself
innocent before a commission that at least strongly suspects he is
guilty. If John or his lawyer construes the regulation differently
than does the commission, that is just unfortunate for John. The
commission made the regulation and is confident that it knows just
what it meant to say. And it is always free to change its mind. John
is in the position of a man whose wife changes her system of
bidding in the middle of a bridge game without notice. He is sure
to lose and is equally sure to get blamed for it.

26
27

28
29

Ibid.
An ABA Report concluded that appointments to administrativ c tribunals arc all too generally classed
as patronage and, it is to be feared, the decisions of some of them arc occasionally dealt with as a
form of patronage. It is not easy to maintain judicial independence or high standards of judicial
conduct whcn a political sword of Damocles continually threatens the judge's source of livelihood.
While a few federal administrative tribunals have, in spite of all obstacles, preserved a high degree of
independence from political pressure and political considerations, unfortunately there arc others
which have yielded and as a result the cause of justice has suffered. Special Report of the Special
Committcc on Administrativ c Law, (1934) 59 American Bar Association 539 at 546 [ABA Special
Report]; See also Jeffrey S. Lubbers, "Federal Administrative Law Judges: A Focus on Our
Invisiblc Judiciary" (1981) 33 Admin L Rc 109 at 111.
ABA Special Report, ibid at 545-46.
Caldwell, supranote 15, at 973-74.
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Separation of functions and status were not the only concerns. Even had examiners
been functionally separate from their agencies, their decisions were not final and
could be overridden by agency superiors.
During the debate, many suggestions were offered regarding how to reform the
system. Some argued that Congress should create a federal administrative court that
would hear only administrative cases." Others suggested that Congress should create
an independent administrative judiciary, a central panel of judges, to adjudicative
administrative matters." Congress ultimately rejected both of these suggestions. In
1946, with the passage of the APA," Congress opted for a third approach that was
unique to administrative law, but included a number of protective components. First,
Congress sought to prevent agency officials from acting as lawmaker, investigator,
prosecutor, and jury in the same case. Importantly, the APA provided that ALJs
could not be responsible to, or subject to supervision by, anyone performing
investigative or prosecutorial functions for an agency." To do so, the APA required
agencies to separate the prosecuting functions of an agency from its adjudicating
functions." Specifically, anyone who investigated or prosecuted a case could not
supervise or direct those individuals who adjudicated the case." Additionally, those
individuals who investigated or prosecuted could not be part of the decisionmaking
process.' Further, the APA limited some exparte communications.
The centerpiece of the APA reforms, however, involved a strengthening of the
position and status of hearing examiners." The APA greatly improved the status of
some, but not all, administrative judges by creating a new position, that of the ALJ

31

See Lubbers, supra note 27 at 111 ("Furthermore, the role of the presiding officer in an agency's
decisional process was often unclear; many agencies would ignore the officer's decisions
wvithout givng reasons, and enter their own dc novo decisions.").
John D. O'Reilly, Jr., "The Federal Administrative Court Proposal: An Examination of General

32

Principles" (1937) 6 Fordham L Rev 365; See also Attorney General's Committee on
Administrativc Procedure - Majority and Minority Reports, (1941) 27 ABA J 91 at 93.
See Rich, supra note 24 at 246 ("Yet the hearing officers were not granted complete independence

3

from the agencies, for the APA allowed them to be assigned exclusively to particular agencies.").
5 U.S.C. § 551 et. seq.

34

3
36

See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2) (2009). Indeed, Congress created a unique system because ofits concern
about separating the adjudicatory function from other conflicting agency functions. In 1970 and
1977 respectively, Congress created the Occupational Safety and Health Rcicw Commission
[OSITRC] and the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review (Commission [FMSITRC]. Both are
independent, Executive Branch agencies located outside the Department of Labor. Importantly, they
have adjudicative authority only. "OSTIRC determines whether regulations promulgated and
enforced by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ha c been violatcd. FM\ISHRC
adjudicates violations of standards promulgated and enforced by the Mdine Safety and Hlealth
Administration." RobinJ. Arzt, "Recommendations for a new Independent Adjudication Agency to
Make the Final Administrative Adjudications of Social Security Act Benefits Claims" (2003) 23
journal of the National -Association of Administrativ c Law judges 267 at 281.
5 U.S.C. § 554(d).
Ibid.

38

Ibid. There were, however, some exceptions. The APA provides that "[t]his subsection does not
apply... to the agency or a member or members of the body comprising the agency." 5 U.S.C. §
554(d)(2)(C). As a result, "a member or members of the body comprising the agency" could be
involved in prosecutorial, investigatory, and adjudicatory functions. Ibid.
5 U.S.C. § 554(d). Congress later imcndcd the APA to add another section designed to addresscx

3

parte communications. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d).
William S. Jordan, III, "Cheiron and hearing rights: An Unintended Combination, (2009) 61 Admin L
Rev 249 at 270 citing Kenneth Culp Davis, Admini rativ Law (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing
Company, 1951) at 309.
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(initially, the APA referred to ALJs as "hearing examiners")," and by giving ALJs
protections designed to bolster their independence." In particular, ALJs were to be
certified by the Office of Personnel Management [OPM] and were not subject to a
probationary period.
OPNI was directed to determine the minimum experience
needed to be an ALJ and to evaluate applicants for the position (by conducting
interviews, administering a test of writing ability, evaluating the experience of
applicants, and ranking eligible applicants).' Despite these improvements, agencies
retained control over the choice of who was actually selected from OPM's register
and who was actually hired into ALJ positions.' In other words, the agencies retained
control over the selection of ALJs who worked for them, even if the pool of available
candidates was shrunk and controlled by OPM.
Once hired, ALJs enjoyTed increased job protections and independence Vis-a-Vis
pre-APA hearing examiners. Although the APA did not grant ALJs the life tenure
granted to Article III judges, ALJs could be removed only for cause or due to a
reduction in workforce. In addition, the APA required that ALJs be assigned cases
in rotation and that ALJs not perform duties inconsistent with their role as ALJs.
Additionally, the APA required that ALJ compensation be determined based on
length of service rather than based on performance evaluations. As the Supreme
Court concluded, these changes made a significant difference in the status of ALJs:
There can be little doubt that the role of the modern federal
hearing examiner or administrative law judge within this
framework is "functionally comparable" to that of a judge. His
powers are often, if not generally, comparable to those of a trial
judge.... More importantly, the process of agency adjudication is
currently structured so as to assure that the hearing examiner
exercises his independent judgment on the evidence before him,
free from pressures by the parties or other officials within the
agency.

40

Marvin H. Iorse, "Th Administrativ Law Judge: ANcw Direction for the Corps?" (1983) 30 Fed
B Ncws &J 398 at 401 n. 2 ("Thc APA ... initially refcrred to presiding officers as examiners,
colloquially referred to as hearing examiners. The title was administratively standardized to
Administrativc Law Judgc by the Civil Service Cornmission in August 1972. The \L title was ratified
by the Act of March 27, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-251, 92 Stat. 183."). See also Paul R. Verkuil al.,
"The Federal Administrative Judiciary" 1992 Administrativc Conference of the United States 771,
798 (1992). In 1978, Congress amended the APA to official change the term from hearing
examincts to administrativc law judges. Pub. L. No. 95-251, 92 Stat. 183 (1978).
See also Rich, supra note 24 at 246. Congress, in its 1946 Adm
r
Procedur A6t [APAl sought to
establish a corps of federal hearing officers that were more independent of the igencies. Hearing
officers were to be given carecr appointments and compcns.tion was to be managed by the Office of
Personnel Management. Yet the hearing officers were not granted complete independence from the
agencies, for the APA allowcd them to be assigned exclusively to particular agencies.
OPMI has been "exclusively responsible for the initial examination, certification for selection, and
compensation of \LJs." Lubbcrs, supra note 27 at 112.

41

42
43

Ibid.
IbiMd.

4
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5 U.S.C. § 7521; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.131 (2007).
5 US.C. § 3105 (2009); 5 C.F.R. § 930.212 (2007).

47

But( /. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978).
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As Michael Asimow and Jeffrey Lubbers have argued," the APA system is hardly
perfect. There are difficulties with selection criteria, as well as with the inability of
agencies to conduct performance evaluations. These concerns may be legitimate, but
are beyond the scope of this article.
III. DEPARTURES FROM THE ARTICLE III JUDICIAL MODEL
Even though the APA significantly altered the status and work of administrative
judges, the APA departed from the Article III judicial model in important respects.
Critically, the APA did not convert all administrative judges into "ALJs." Indeed, the
APA did not even require that all administrative adjudications be conducted by
ALJs. Rather, the APA required only that ALJs be used for "formal," as opposed to
"informal," hearings." Today, informal adjudication is much more prevalent than
formal adjudication as a consequence of the Supreme Court's decision in FloridaEast
Coast Ry. P. United States (which created a presumption in favour of informality for
rulemaking), and the lower courts' application of this principle to adjudication." As a
result, many administrative judges continue to decide cases without the status of an
ALJ.
Even when the APA (or the agency's governing statute) requires an agency to use
an ALJ, the APA limits the ALJs' power. Specifically, the drafters of the AR chose
not to give ALJs complete control over the cases they decided. Thus, if an agency
wished, the agency was free to decide the case itself or to have the case heard by one
or more members of the body comprising the agency. If the agency did not choose
one of those two options, however, the APA did require the agency to have one or
more ALJs appointed to preside at the taking of evidence." But, even when an ALJ
heard a case, the APA did not require the agency to allow the ALJ to render the final
decision in the case." The agency could command "either in specific cases or by
general rule, the entire record to be certified to it for decision."" In other words, the
agency could direct the ALJ to act as no more than an information gatherer.
48

49

See Michael Asimox and Jcffrcy S. Lubbcrs, "The Merits of "crits" Review: A Comparative Look
at the -Austraihan Adminmstrativc Appcals Tribunal" (2010) 28:2 Windsor YB Access just, for a more
detailed discussion of these issues ["The M\erits of "Milerits" Review"].
Cheron .S.A., Inc. v. NaturalResourcesDefnseCoua, I, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

50

Section 554 of the APA applics "in ccry case of adjudication rcquircd by statute to be determined
on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing." 5 U.S.C. § 554(a).

1

A

410 U.S. 224 (1973) (suggesting that Congress must use relatively specific language in its enabling
statute to trigger formal rulcmalong).
Chl ast a
Igm'l, Inc.t. U.S. IPA, 873 F.2d 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that Cher deference
applies to an agency's decision regarding whether a formal rather than an informal adjudication was
required by the enabhng statutc). But sec Jordan, supra note 39, at 254 (arguing that the A/I
crcatcs
a presumption that formal adjudication should apply unless Congress clearly provides otherwise);
Meissa Ml. Berry, "Beyond Cheron's Domain: Agcncy Interpretations of Statutory Procedural
Provisions, (2007) 30 Seattle UJ Rev 541 (arguing that Congress did not intend to delegate this
decision to the agencies in light of concerns about agency self-interest and fairness); john F.
Stanley, "The "'Magic Words' of § 554: A New Test for Formal Adjudication Under the
Administrati c Procedure Act", Note, (2005) 56 Hastings Lj 1067 (suggcsting that Skidmore
deference would be a better deference standard for review of agency decisions regarding the
formaihty of the proccdurc rcquircd by the iPA).
5 U.S.C. § 554(a).
5 U.SC. 556(b).

-5
56

5 U.S.C.
5 U.S.C.

52

53

557.
557(b).
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Perhaps most importantly, although the ALJ's decision would become the
agency's final decision if it were not appealed to the agency, the agency retained broad
authority to review the ALJ's decision and to substitute its own judgment for that of
the ALJ." The net effect was that administrative judges were "subservient to their
agencies in the permanency of their decisions."" Unlike Article III judges, who are
immune from executive override (even Congress has limited authority to overrule
their decisions retroactively), ALJs (at the agency's option) can be forced to play a
minimal (advisory), even no, role in adjudication.
Hence, although the APA improved the administrative law judge's independence
and impartiality' in many ways, the reforms were not intended to and did not give
administrative judges the status of Article III judges, not completely shift the nature
of the administrative adjudicative process.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE CURRENT SYSTEM
For decades, commentators have suggested alternative models for administrative
adjudication. Of course, any suggested reform must deal with fundamental tradeoffs. In other words, even if some might prefer to make administrative adjudication
more independent and impartial, the question is whether and, if so to what extent,
executive agencies should be allowed to ensure that adjudicative decisions conform to
the policy and political concerns of agency administrators. A number of suggestions
have been made for how to resolve this fundamental conflict. Below are a few
options that other scholars have suggested along with a few new ideas.
A. Expanding APA Protections to Administrative Judges
One solution to this problem would be to extend ALJ-like protections to more
administrative judges. It is difficult to deny that the APA has brought significant
improvements to the status of those administrative judges denominated "ALJs."
However, it is also difficult to deny the fact that the APA left a variety of
administrative judges without the benefit of ALJ status. As we noted earlier, informal
adjudications are much more common today than perhaps was originally envisioned
by the APA drafters, and therefore many of the decisionmakers in these informal
adjudications function with fewer protections than ALJs. So, one possibility would
be to require that more administrative adjudications be conducted as "formal" (rather
than "informal") proceedings." If that were done, then the APA would require
agencies to make greater use of ALJs (with, of course, greater protections than the
administrative judges currently deciding their cases).
57
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Molitcrno, supa note 21, at 1224.
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"Impartiality as a judicial trait is often confused with independence. Impartiality is about fair-minded,
neutral decisionmaking. Independence is created primarily by structural aspects of government.
Impartiality is created primarily by the structure of the dispute resolution process. All judges arc in
systems that foster impartiality; some judges are in structures that foster independence." Mfoliterno,
supra note 21, at 1199.
This topic is beyond the bounds of this paper; however, for an excellent discussion of this issue, see
Jordan, supra note 39 at 254 (arguing that formal adjudication should apply unless Congress clearly
providcs otherwise in the enabling statutc); Michacl Asimow, "The Spreading Umbrcl1a: Extending
the APA's Adjudication Provisions to all Evidentiary Hearings Required by Statute "(2004) 56 Admin
L Rc 1003 (suggesting that some APA protections, c.g. expate prohibitions, should be accorded to
adjudications that while not formal under the APA distinction are very procedurally prescribed due
to statutory requirements). Accord, Bcrry, supa note 52, at 579-80 (suggcsting that Congress did not
intend for agencies to choose whether formal or informal hearings were appropriate).
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The downside to this approach is that it may not be wise to unduly formalize the
administrative process. Formal procedures are more involved and burdensome, and
require administrative agencies to provide greater process to litigants." However,
more is not always better, and an enhanced process is not always preferable to an
informal process. For example, administrative agencies frequently conduct so-called
"due process" hearings under the United States Supreme Court's decision in Goldberg
v. Kelly. Under that decision, courts are required to grant hearings in a variety of
contexts, not by virtue of a congressional mandate, but rather because a hearing is
required under one of the due process clauses." Even though a due process hearing
might be required in a given case, the Court does not require that the process be
"formal" in the APA sense. On the contrary, the Court has recognized that it is
often permissible to allow agencies to utilize less involved procedures. Indeed, in the
Court's decision in Matthews v. Eldridge," the Court suggested that the amount of
process required in a given case should depend upon a balancing of the need for
enhanced procedures against the burden that the additional procedures would impose
on the administrative process. A shift to a widespread use of formal hearing
procedures would necessarily impose a much greater burden on the agencies involved
and might discourage agencies from granting hearings in more cases (and,
correspondingly, may discourage courts from ordering more hearings).

B. The Central Panel and Federal Administrative Court Systems
Denouncing the present system as one that hinders independence, many ALJs
enthusiastically support the option of creating a central panel of administrative law
judges (essentially, an independent administrative judiciary managed by a central
administrator).
ALJs were not the first to propose this option. As noted earlier,
prior to the enactment of the APA, some commentators argued for creation of a
central panel system." During enactment of the APA, the idea was revived and
discussed further.- A variation of the central panel option would be to establish a
single, federal administrative court. The judges on such a court would hear only
administrative cases."
As noted, when Congress enacted the APA, it specifically rejected both the single
panel and administrative court options, choosing instead to have ALJs work within
the agencies for which they adjudicate and to have ALJs report to non-ALJs within
those agencies. As a result, instead "of establishing the examiners as an independent
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397 U.S. 254 (1970)

§§ 556 & 557

(2009).

66

The Constitution contains two due process clauses; one located in the Fifth Amendment and one
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Molitemo, supra note 21, at 1227 (citing Victor W. Palmer, "The Administrative Procedure Act: After
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("[C]orps of highly responsiblk hearing officers [\was] orginally put forward by the Attorncy General's
Committee.").
68

While the two arc similar, a federal administrative court would actually hear cases. In contrast, a
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corps, as recommended in the minority report, the responsibility for protecting
critical elements in the employment of hearing examiners was entrusted to the Civil
Service Commission.""
Despite Congress's rejection of the central panel option, support for that idea has
never entirely disappeared. In 1983, "[t]he Judicial Administration Division passed a
resolution ... favoring the passage of legislation to establish federal administrative law
judges as an independent corps."
Some scholars have made similar
recommendations,- and central panels have been used successfully in a number of
states.There are a number of advantages to the central panel and federal administrative
court options. First, both systems would increase efficiency by allowing for
centralized organization and management of ALJ offices. Rather than having lots of
judges scattered among a variety of agencies, there would be one large judicial
structure. Second, impartiality, or at least the appearance of impartiality, would
increase as administrative judges would be located outside of the agencies for which
they decide cases. Under the current system, litigants (especially pro se litigants) may
be uncertain about the impartiality of administrative judges who work for the agency
that the litigants are appearing before."
One primary concern-judicial independence-would likely increase as well. As
Justice Scalia has recognized, the "problem of improper influence would ... be solved
by implementing proposals for establishment of a unified ALJ corps, headed by an
independent administrator."- At least one commentator agreed with Justice Scalia
when he stated that the "basic purpose of the central panel system is to give ALJs a
certain amount of independence from the agencies over whose proceedings they
preside...."' As these comments suggest, judicial independence is less achievable
when administrative judges are employees of the agencies for which they decide cases,
and a federal administrative court separates litigants from their agencies.
But proposals to create either a central panel system or a federal administrative
tribunal are not without disadvantages as well. Indeed, in a 1992 study prepared by
the Administrative Conference of the United States, the idea of a central panel system
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1id at 39.
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may be the administrative judge's co-worker. Third, the agency's experts may also be co-workers of
the judge. Finally, the administrator of one of the htigants will control the judge's budget. Ioitcrno,
supranote 21 at 1195.
Antonin Scalia, "The \L Fiasco-a Rcpris" (1979) 47 U Chicago L Rev 57 at 79.
Allen C. Hoberg, "Administrative Hearings: State Central Panels in the 1990s "(1994) 46 Admin I
Rev 75 at 76).
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was rejected.- Moreover, despite the language quoted above, Justice Scalia is more
opposed to the option than in favour of it. Why? Some scholars question whether
The Constitution
administrative judges need or require greater independence.
granted Article III judges life tenure in order to ensure that they could function
independently of the executive and legislative branches and, therefore, could provide
a check on the powers of those branches.7 Administrative judges do not perform
that same function.7 As one commentator noted, "administrative judges are meant to
make impartial decisions, but not to be independent... in the sense of that word that
connotes the usual judge's attribute. They were meant to be impartial decisionmakers
and advancers of agency policy, not independent ones.""
To some degree, the
central panel and federal administrative court options attempt to transform ALJs into
Article III judges who are free to police the executive branch and either advance or
even hinder executive policies." "[I]nsofar as [these options] further the rupture of
the administrative judiciary from the executive branch, they are an undesirable
development in the law.",s2
Another disadvantage of these options would be that some regulatory schemes
are highly specialized, and ALJs may need special expertise to adjudicate effectively
under those schemes. In other words, it is not clear that an ALJ could hear an
Environmental Protection Agency case one day, a Nuclear Regulatory Commission
case the next, and a Securities and Exchange Commission case on the third day and
rule competently in each. The current system allows ALJs to work within their
particular areas of expertise. Having said that, we note that there is no similar
concern with Article III judges exercising expertise in a variety of regulatory areas.
For example, the D.C. Circuit regularly hears all kinds of administrative law cases, yet
it has no special expertise in any of the underlying substantive areas."
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Supreme Court:
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There remains a more fundamental problem with the central panel option, which
might not be true of the federal administrative court option: the agency would still be
the final decisionmaker under the APA and could freely substitute its judgment for
that of the ALJ. If the agency retains the final say in the case, there is perhaps less
reason to be concerned about the need for administrative judges to function
independently since they are simply rendering the initial decision. Of course, the
APA could be altered to vest final decisionmaking authority in administrative judges
rather than in the head of the agency. However, if that change were made,
administrative judges would assume a much greater policy role within the agency than
they have currently. As they interpret and apply regulatory provisions, they would
assume greater responsibility for "saying what those provisions mean," and,
therefore, give content to the scheme itself As a result, the agency would have less
control over its regulatory scheme and its regulatory law.
In addition, establishing a federal administrative court, in particular, would likely
be very expensive and require a complete change to the current system. Thus, while
the central panel and federal administrative court options have some advantages,
ultimately, neither approach provides a panacea to the deficiencies of the present
system.
C. Establishing More Article I Courts
Another option would be for Congress to create more Article I courts. Article I,
or legislative, courts are created by Congress pursuant to its Article I powers, and
Congress has created such courts to review the final administrative decisions of some
agencies. Two such examples include the Tax Court,8 5 which hears appeals from
Internal Revenue System's tax decisions, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims, which hears appeals of benefits decisions made by the Board of Veterans
Appeals. 8 These courts take many forms and vary in their level of independence
from the executive and legislative branches.
For example, judicial protection is
generally limited. While Article III judges enjoy lifetime tenure and protected salaries,
Article I judges are not subject to these protections. Yet most, if not all, Article I
courts are both separately located from their agencies and have the power to issue
final decisions.
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The Tax Court was established to address both independence and impartiality: [PIt would never be
possible to giNc to the taxpayer the fair and independent rc icw to which he is of right entitled as
long as the appellate tribunal is directly under, and its recommendations subject to the approval of,
the officer whose duty it is to administer the law and collect the tax. As long as the ippellatc tribunal
is part and parcel of the collecting machinery it can hardly maintain the attitude essential to a judicial
tribunal. Report ofTax Simpification Board: Hearing on H.R. Rep. No. 68-103, at 4 (1st Scss. 1923).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims was created by Congress in 1988 to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over the decisions of the Board of Veterans' Appeals on the motion of claimants. The
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There are advantages to a decision to create more such courts. First, judicial
independence and impartiality would both increase; as with central panels and the
federal administrative law court, administrative judges would be housed outside of the
agencies for which they work and would not be subject to agency oversight.
Additionally, Article I judges would be the final agency decisionmakers. While their
decisions are appealable to Article III courts, agencies would have no ability to
overrule the Article I court's decision. Importantly, however, unlike these other
options, expertise would not be sacrificed; Article I judges would have expertise
within their assigned areas and would likely make better decisions in areas that are
legally complex and that involve highly technical facts.
But the potential costs in establishing many more Article I courts would likely be
staggering, likely even more so than establishing one, federal administrative court
system. Another potential disadvantage would be that agencies would no longer be
able to formulate policy via adjudication; rather, all policy would have to be made via
legislative and non-legislative rulemaking." Under current case law, agencies have
discretion about whether to articulate new policy legislatively or adjudicatively."
'While some commentators criticized this legal development,' the choice has remained
the agency's for more than sixty years. Certainly, agencies should strive to articulate
broadly applicable policy via rulemaking rather than adjudication, but choice furthers
flexibility." Even if agencies wanted to articulate all policy by using rulemaking
procedures, it would be impossible for them to do so; case-by-case development is a
necessary and inevitable part of administrative policymaking. Hence, any change to
the adjudicative structure that would effectively require agencies to articulate policy
exclusively via legislative procedures would be undesirable.
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Finally, the more the new system looks like the old Article III system, the more
likely the new system will become more adversarial, more expensive, and more
protracted for litigants and agencies.
Professors Michael Asimow and Jeffrey Lubbers have argued for a slightly
different formulation of this idea." They suggest creation of "a single adjudicating
tribunal, referred to as a Benefits Review Tribunal [BRT]" which would handle
benefits review cases from Social Security, the Veterans Administration, and perhaps
benefits programs administered by the Department of Labor. Their proposed system
finds its roots in the Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal. In the abstract, the
proposal might draw strong support from ALJs because it places them outside of the
agencies for which they adjudicate cases and helps ensure their independence.
However, ALJs would be subject to the governing agencies "hard" law and "soft"
law. In other words, at least in theory, the ALJs in this new tribunal would not be
expected or allowed to "make law." We suspect that ALJs will strongly oppose the
proposal because professors Asimow and Lubbers hope that the new tribunal would
exercise greater control over ALJ hiring, supervision, compensation, case -assignment,
evaluation, and discharge. For example, they suggest a peer review procedure for
evaluating work product, and many ALJs object to the notion of performance
reviews. In addition, we are not certain that this new tribunal will be able to
successfully decide benefits cases without venturing into the arena of policy creation.
D. Changing the APA Process
Another possibility would be to alter the APA review process to prohibit agencies
from reviewing the decisions of administrative judges. Currently, the head of an
administrative agency serves as the court of last resort for the administrative process
and has the power to issue the agency's final decision." Hence, the agency reviews all
ALJ findings de noPo.

The current system could be altered in a variety of ways. First, Congress could
amend the APA and mandate that the head of the agency be more deferential to the
administrative judge's decision. For example, Congress might provide that the agency
head can only review the administrative judge's findings for "clear error" or for an
"abuse of discretion." This higher standard could apply to all ALJ findings or just to a
subset of findings such as findings of fact. Currently, the agency head should give
some weight to credibility findings based on demeanour, but may review all other
findings of fact de novo." In contrast, Article III courts can set aside lower court
findings of fact only when those findings are "clearly erroneous."" A higher standard
of review for factual findings would give ALJs greater independence and authority. If
the standard for reviewing agency policy and legal decisions remained the same -de
novo- then the agency would retain its ability to formulate policy and interpret statutes
while ALJs would play a role more like that of a trial judge. The disadvantages of this
change are not readily apparent. But the change would be so minor, it may not be
worth the effort to amend the APA.
A second approach would be to provide for finality of ALJ (and, for that matter,
administrative judge) decisions. This approach is popular among those who support
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the central panel system, which usually includes the idea of finality.' While finality is
not an essential attribute of a central panel system, the model act creating a state
central hearing agency specifically provides that administrative judges can issue either
initial or final decisions." An advantage of this option would be that administrative
judges could play a much stronger, more independent, and final role in the
adjudicative process. Indeed, the decisions of administrative judges (and ALJs) would
become the final decision of the agency and would not be subject to reversal by the
agency litigant.
The disadvantage of this second approach would be that agencies heads, who are
both politically accountable and often experts in the field, would lose control over
their agencies' decisions, which can create agency policy. Giving ALJs finality would
transform administrative judges into something like Article III judges, meaning that
ALJs would be able to render judgments on the actions of the executive branch
without any review from that branch. "That is not the role for which administrative
judges were created."" As one commentator noted,
Administrative judges, unlike Article III judges, exist in order to
further the policies of the executive branch, specifically the agency
for which they judge, through the impartial adjudication of
disputes. Allowing administrative judges final authority over policy
and perhaps even over fact findings, however, would thwart that
end.... Administrative judges would be rendered cAPAble of
deciding cases in contradiction with the stated policies of the
executive branch."
Additionally, inconsistencies could be created between an agency's articulated policies
and ensuing adjudications. This might create uncertainty in the law, result in loss of
political accountability, and nullify agency experience in formulating policy under its
statutory mandate."" Adjudicative policymaking is inherent in an effective regulatory
regime.
An additional problem might result from a lack of flexibility for policy-making.
As we mentioned earlier, agencies can choose to articulate regulatory policy either
legislatively or adjudicatively.- At times, case-by-case policy development is the best
choice.
To the extent that this change could preclude agencies from articulating
policy via adjudication, then it is less than ideal.
V. CONCLUSION
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Is there a better way to structure the modem administrative adjudicatory system?
Probably, but the way is not clear. While, the 4PA's ALJ protections could be
expanded to include more administrative judges, it would certainly be unrealistic, and
likely counter-productive, to elevate all administrative judges to ALJ status. Cases
such as Goldberg v. Kelym and Goss v. Lopezs greatly expanded the number of hearings
agencies must now provide. With more formality comes added expense and delay,
for both sides. As the Supreme Court made clear in Mathews v. Eldridge, the interest
of litigants in more procedure and formality must be balanced against the agency's
interest in quicker, more streamlined, and less expensive procedures. Yet, the current
system favors expediency over judicial independence. Including more administrative
judges within the umbrella of protection might tilt the balance back.
Additionally, altering the deference standard would similarly increase judicial
independence in a relatively small way, but at little cost to the agency. So long as the
agency remains free to decide policy issues de novo, perhaps even legal issues, the
agency retains its ability to formulate policy. But even combined, these two changes
are likely only to have a minimal impact on improving judicial independence. And
while creating more Article I courts would increase independence more dramatically,
this option would be unduly expensive and unlikely to garner much support in
Congress during these tough economic times. While an Article I court could be
structured like the Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal, as professors Asimow
and Lubbers suggest, that proposal is likely to draw intense ALJ opposition.
The remaining options present a more fundamental question: whether the
administrative adjudicative structure should be fundamentally reshaped. These
proposals (the central panel system, the notion of ALJ finality, and the idea for an
administrative court) all contemplate that administrative judges would play a much
greater role in shaping and formulating agency policy. Through their decisions,
administrative judges would construe and apply regulatory provisions. And at least
some of the proposals contemplate that there should be no review of these decisions
within agencies. Long ago, Congress decided that this loss of control would be
undesirable. The choice remains a reasonable one.
Thus, while it might be time to reform our current administrative adjudicatory
system, it is not clear which, if any of these options, would best balance the
competing interests and further the administrative agenda.
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